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BOOK REVIEW
THE PERSONALITY OF LAWYERS, by Walter D. Weyrauch,
Yale University Press, New Haven, 1964, 316 pages. Price: $7.50.
Most studies of groups, particularly influential or powerful ones, receive
weighty criticism. This may be due to a transparent insistence on making
an unpopular point, shoddy workmanship in collecting data, or a poor presentation. Mr. Weyrauch's findings, based primarily on his interviews with
German legal personage, will receive close scrutiny for their revelations are
enlightening to the relatively non-introspective legal group. The author's
statements and evaluations are not an attack upon lawyers, but a sincere
attempt to expose subjective predispositions and perspectives as they affect
the progress of law. It is an enlightened man's search for improvement to
negate the defects in the practice of law. This study provides a strong beginning.
In anticipation of criticism the interviewer devotes one-fourth of the
book to relaying the background of the interviewer, the components of the
sample, the evolution of the research problem, the characteristics of the
interviews and a preview of the eight value categories which best represent
the perspectives revealed. Weyrauch's choice of a primarily German sample
was governed by "expediency"; that is, his knowledge of the cultural environment, social status and past behavior of the subject. These elements
were deemed requisite to assure potentially the best subjects for the nonstatistical study and to place the interviewer in a situation most compatible
with his own background and knowledge. A clinical study of a few cases
coupled with the use of free association of ideas were used. The value categories of enlightenment, skills, respect, affection, rectitude, power, wealth
and well-being generally delimited the interview.
Some of the study's discoveries of German lawyer perspectives are
not surprising while others are dismaying. The law appears to be attractive
to compulsive personalities due to overemphasis on skills and procedures
as a means of objectifying painful realities of life and personal relationships.
Since there is no need of definitive solutions, and generalizations are rightfully scorned, the "sporadic interviews" serve as illustrations presenting
no average, but convincing tendencies.
Weyrauch found that most subjects were security-ridden, though not
materially greedy even in their middle-years. All were anxious to retire
early so they could spend their time on hobbies, travel, family, gardening
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and personal writing. The implication of a return to the basics of life and a
highly subjective atmosphere as a retirement goal inversely reveals the
extent of objectivity in which most subjects now live and how much they
privately chafe at it. To what extent this strong reaction is due to the
involvement with legal processes peculiar to Germany and how much is
self-made anxiety forms the debatable portion of the evaluations made in
this study. Weyrauch clearly establishes that individuals do react to the law
in diverse ways. His rationalizations for an individual's concrete acts in
the legal process appear to be in accord with those of psychiatrists and
sociologists, on whom he relied heavily throughout his analysis.
German courts, often composed of laymen and professional judges,
decide questions of fact and law. The decision process, which the interviewer
describes as a relaxed informal conversation in Judges' chambers gravitating
to a specific outcome, was generally acquiesced to by the subjects. Three major
groups of lawyers emerged: adherents of abstract and deductive reasoning;
those who seemed to rely heavily on inspiration and intuition in finding
the law; and those who could not support either legal doctrine, but relied on
a "hunch" approach. The tight, restricted, unarguable precepts handed down
in German opinions are demonstrative evidence of the general mental state.
As a group, lawyers may have predispositions and tendencies for
rationalization that hinder equitable application of legal values. The skills
and high legal ideals mask the true motivations behind the law as it is
practiced. Taking refuge in detail is an apt description of many subjects'
temperaments and deeds. A trait common to all was a philosophy of extreme
individualism and a high degree of "preoccupation with questions of taste,
style and beauty," to which the real value obsession-respect-was thought
to be closely linked. It is the extent of the effect of these traits on society,
not their personal excessiveness, that requires attention. A lack of awareness of these motivational forces, and continued use of bad choice compensations, will perpetuate poor functioning.
German legal education seems a contributing factor to these distortions. Students, attorneys and judges alike were scornful of the quality of
their education. Their criticisms attacked the discrepancies between what
is preached and what is practiced. A long apprenticeship before private
practice and the political overtones for successful professorial appointment
combine to form added dissatisfaction. Moreover, the dichotomized law institutes, separating the overspecialized professors and the students, add dismay
to the system. The bar and the professors accuse each other of lack of
originality, unclarified thought and vagueness. Most fascinating are the
revelations on perspectives on the law itself. The kaleidoscopic remarks by
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the subjects on what they think about the fundamental concepts of law
revealed that law is considered a procedure akin to business.
The obstacles to exposure, change and renewed motivation toward
practical accomplishment of ideal standards in law are obvious. The dilemma
of men thinking and working in conflict with ideals indicates a basic dissatisfaction with themselves and the law. Anxiety reactions appear to be
particularly acute in the legal profession. For comparison, interviews with
non-lawyers on similar professional problems and attitudes are offered to
display the differences in perspectives.
Weyrauch's suggested remedies for these inherent defects will be
valuable if the legal profession will accept them as constructive criticisms.
The remedies are "enlightenment" through acceptance of the impact which
lawyers' predispositions have upon the social processes and through avoidance of the self-deceptions inherent in rationalizations under abstract standards. This enlightenment will be achieved only through a program of
"persuasive," not coercive, language and deeds. A de-emphasis on skill must
begin through re-evaluation in accord with the proper purposes of technique
and skills. Preventive measures can be achieved through studies on the psychological function of techniques pervasive in the law. The use of non-legal
scholars on law faculties teaching law subjects should be encouraged. The
author advocates that some law professors be trained in both law and
psychiatry.
In essence with this knowledge of the legal process, lawyers will recognize the heavy weight of subjective elements in decision making and cease
to evade personal responsibility by hiding behind a system of seemingly
objective standards and rituals of procedure. With this admission and
control, lawyers will eliminate unnecessary dogma and become creative.
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